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Rival Factions Remain After Ouster of Goncalves

The removal of the pro-Communist Vasco Goncalves from the Portuguese leadership leaves the armed forces divided into opposing factions, but may improve Admiral Azevedo's chances of forming a new government. There has been no public reaction from the rival factions.

A communique issued after a rump session of the Armed Forces General Assembly last night said Goncalves had "declined" the post of chief of staff of the armed forces. It is clear, however, that he has been forced out by anti-Communist officers in the army and air force.

Goncalves and three of his closest supporters were also purged from the Revolutionary Council, which has ap-

parently regained most of its former power as Portugal's dominant policy-making body.

The communique was issued following a stormy meeting attended by Goncalves, President Costa Gomes, the chiefs of staff of the three armed services, security chief Carvalho, and representatives of each of the services.

Earlier in the day the army again voted to boycott the armed forces assembly and to delegate chief of staff Fabiao to present the demand for Goncalves' ouster. The air force voted to follow suit.

Goncalves' removal may have been part of yet another attempt by the President to arrange a compromise that would not

make any faction a complete winner or loser. In addition to the pro-Communist officers purged from the Revolutionary Council, Commander Vitor Crespo, a loyal supporter of Major Melo Antunes, was dropped.

A membership list for the revamped council also failed to include Antunes and Major Vitor Alves, leaders of the anti-Goncalves drive. The assembly communique said the council would have to decide later whether these two, along with Goncalves' labor minister Costa Martins, would be asked to rejoin its membership.

Separate lists for the revised council apparently were drawn up by the individual service assemblies earlier this week. The members, all previously on the council, reflect the predominant political leanings of the services they represent. The anti-Communist faction generally associated with Antunes appears to have a majority, although that could be changed by the switch of only a few votes.

This apparent effort at a compromise may defuse the situation, which had moved dangerously close to a violent confrontation, although there has been no indication of how either the Antunes or Goncalves factions are reacting to the announced changes. General Carvalho was quoted as saying after the
(See Portuguese... Page 4)

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 SATURDAY SEPTEMBER 6, 1975

TCS 638/75 THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

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WESTERN EUROPE

Majority May Fight for Antunes; Goncalves Has Edge in Lisbon

From Page 1

there and a stalemate could develop.

A Counterinsurgency Force

Portugal's armed forces number an estimated 113,550: about 65,000 in the army, 10,450 in the air force, 11,700 in the navy (including 1,700 marines), and 26,400 in the paramilitary forces. Portuguese military training, tactics, and equipment have all been geared to keeping order in the colonies. Its experience has been in counterinsurgency.

The majority of the army officers and men in the Lisbon Military Region are probably pro-Goncalves, although recent events have shown that a sizable opposition to the former prime minister exists in Lisbon.

The 1,900 troops in the Lisbon Engineer Regiment and the Lisbon Light Artillery Regiment would almost certainly come down on the side of Goncalves; 75 percent of the 2,000 Military Police are said to favor Goncalves, and the 1,100-man Queluz Infantry Regiment is thought to be evenly split.

The Antunes group has the backing of key units near Lisbon, the 11th Commando Regiment, the Santarem Cavalry School, and the Cascais Artillery, a total of some 3,500 men. More important, these units control approximately 50 armored personnel carriers and two battalions of tanks—the only armor in the Lisbon Military Region.

The commander of the region, General Otelo de Carvalho, has indicated support for the Antunes group, though this support is far from certain.

The units of the Northern Military Region are anti-Communist, reflecting the deeply conservative political orientation of that area. The regional commander, General Eurico Corvacho, is, however, a militant Goncalves supporter.

A number of northern units last week refused to take orders from Corvacho. Army troops in this area number about 13,000 and are almost certain to line up against Goncalves in a showdown.

The commanders of the Central and Southern military regions were among the original supporters of the Antunes group. The commander of the Central Military Region, General Franco Charais, has



Sentry at Portuguese commando headquarters near Lisbon

threatened to use his 18,000 loyal troops "to prevent the development of a new dictatorship," and to back up his threat he has kept his units on maneuvers since last week.

The sympathies of the 9,000 men in the Southern Military Region units are less clear. The Antunes forces do not seem to feel that they can count on these units, but they would not figure prominently in Antunes' strategy if he follows his plan to proceed gradually from the north toward Lisbon.

The orientation of the air force would be important in a showdown. The air force has 2,200 paratroops, who are among Portugal's most experienced and

dependable fighters. Aircraft would be a major factor in any fighting. Most of the major air bases are close to Lisbon.

The air force has the reputation of being the most anti-Communist of the services. The air force chief has taken a stand against Goncalves, and the air force officers seem to be basically pro-Antunes. So do the paratroopers.

Noncommissioned officers, however, are more radical in orientation, and the dual-command system in which sergeants must approve orders from unit commanders before the orders can be carried out could interfere with air force operations in any set-to.

The paramilitary forces—the Republican National Guard and the Public Security Police—are overwhelmingly anti-Communist. They are armed with light infantry weapons, are capable and experienced, and could be quite effective on the side of the moderates. They are spread, in small units, throughout the country.

The Balance

Overall, the balance in manpower between the two factions would appear to be weighted about 70 to 30 in favor of the Antunes group.

• Antunes probably could count upon a high percentage of the 40,000 men in the Northern, Central, and Southern military regions, virtually all of the 26,400 paramilitary personnel, most of the air force, and the armor.

• Goncalves can probably count upon somewhat more than half of the army in the Lisbon Region and, almost certainly, the navy and the marines.

Quite apart from the problem of political loyalty is the question whether any Portuguese unit can be counted upon to respond to orders from any authority. Discipline in the armed services has been deeply eroded during the past 16 months. The left-wing marine battalion has been described by a British source as "even by Portuguese standards, notably scruffy, ill-disciplined, and unsoldierly."

Questions also surround key support units.

• Army transport personnel, for example, come under the general staff in Lisbon rather than unit or regional commanders and might not provide needed transportation services in a military action.

• Communications units have been heavily infiltrated by pro-Communists and could not be counted upon by Antunes.

• The government has reportedly been withholding adequate fuel supplies from several air bases and tank units in an effort to ensure that these resources would not be used in a rebellion.

Portuguese Rival Factions . . .

From Page 1

meeting yesterday that it contributed nothing to restoring unity or tranquility in Portugal.

The principal demand of the Antunes group and democratic political parties—the ouster of Gouveia—was met, however, and prime minister designate Azevedo may now find greater cooperation in forming a government.

Socialist leader Soares' demands for elections and a separation of civilian and military responsibilities and his strong criticism of the Communist Party will pose problems, however, if Azevedo continues to press for a government that includes the Socialists, Communists, and Popular Democrats.

With yesterday's decisions failing to resolve decisively the factional power struggle, there also remains the possibility of the rightist forces of former president

Spicola playing the spoiler role.